Dangerousness and Expertise Redux
Christopher Slobogin*
Over two decades ago, I wrote an article entitled “Dangerousness and
Expertise” which tried to work through how the rules of evidence should apply
to expert testimony aimed at predicting future antisocial behavior.1 This article
addresses the same issue, and reaches a similar conclusion: expert prediction
testimony based on empirically-derived probability assessments usually should
be admissible, whether proffered by the government or the defense, but clinical
prediction testimony, which is still the predominant method of proving
dangerousness, should be excluded unless the defense uses it in its case-inchief. Despite the parallel reasoning in this article and the previous one, a new
analysis of the way courts make determinations about future violence is
necessary, for a number of reasons.
First, as society grows increasingly frustrated with the failure of the
traditional punishment system to protect its citizens, dangerousness has
become increasingly popular as a criterion for depriving people of liberty. The
most obvious example of this phenomenon is the “sex-predator law”
movement. Since 1990 over one-third of the states have enacted laws that
permit indeterminate post-sentence commitment of sex offenders considered to
be “predisposed” to violent behavior.2 On authority of these statutes, well over
2500 people have been committed as sexual predators and thousands of others
have been subjected to such sexual predator hearings.3 Even more expansive
“dangerous offender” laws, which permit post-sentence confinement of any
offender perceived to have violent tendencies, have also been enacted.4
Meanwhile, dangerousness determinations remain important in many
other areas of the law. While since 1970 criminal sentencing has generally
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1Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L.REV. 97 (1984).
2See W. Lawrence Fitch & Debra A. Hammen, The New Generation of Sex Offender Commitment
Laws: Which States Have Them and How Do They Work?, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 27, 33 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds., 2003).
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2,478 individuals had been committed or were being held as sexually violent predators in the
United States).
4See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 2920-2981, passed in 1986.
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moved toward fixed terms based on backward-looking culpability
assessments,5 recent Supreme Court decisions could push the states toward
indeterminate dispositions grounded on risk assessments,6 and several states
continue to make the risk of future violent crime an aggravating circumstance
in death penalty cases.7 Finally, of course, the civil commitment laws of
virtually every state focus on the likelihood of imminent serious bodily harm,8
and similar provisions authorize commitment of those found not guilty by
reason of insanity.9
A second reason a fresh look at methods of proving dangerousness is
needed is that prediction methodology has significantly improved.
Two
decades ago, actuarial models of predicting violent behavior were in their
infancy and the dominant method of evaluating dangerousness was essentially
seat-of-the-pants, “clinical” speculation. Today the development of several
sophisticated, empirically-validated risk assessment instruments has made
prediction much more of a science.10
A third reason the topic addressed in this article is worth revisiting is
that the law of evidence has changed significantly. Until 1993, most courts
evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony using one of two tests: the
“balancing test” (derived from the balancing required by Federal Rules of
Evidence 401, 402 and 40311), which weighs the probative value of the evidence
against the likelihood it would mislead or confuse the factfinder or unfairly
prejudice one of the parties, and the Frye test (derived from Frye v. United
States12), which looks at whether the basis of the testimony is “generally
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U.S.C. § 994 (c) (stating that sentences should be based only on offense characteristics and
deterrence); 28 U.S.C. §994 (k) (rejecting rehabilitation as a goal of sentencing); 18 U.S.C. §
3624(a)(b) (abolishing parole).
6Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VALPARAISO L.
REV. 693, 726-27, 732-33 (2005) (describing the impact of the Apprendi, Blakely and Booker cases–
U.S. Supreme Court cases restructuring sentencing that were all decided since 2000–and
predicting much more variation in sentencing, based in part on predictive criteria).
7At least six states have such provisions. Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of
Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious DecisionMaking, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 64 n.5 (2005).
8Id., 668-670.
9Id., 842.
10See infra Part II.
11Rule 401 defines relevance, Rule 402 stats that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided” and Rule 403 states that “relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed” by the types of factors mentioned in the text.
12293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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accepted” among professionals in the relevant field.13 Today, however, the
federal courts and more than half the states follow Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,14 which, at least on its face, is much tougher to meet. Daubert
requires that expert testimony be validated or verified, preferably using
scientific methodology that produces error rates, and only secondarily through
assessment of whether the basis of the testimony is generally accepted.15
The reason Daubert, Frye and other tests of expert admissibility are
important in this context is that dangerousness assessments are often bottomed,
if not wholly dependent, on the opinions of psychiatrists and psychologists. In
some settings, particularly in connection with noncapital sentencing
proceedings, dangerousness determinations may be based entirely on lay
judgments, usually made by probation officers and judges. But in numerous
other settings–in particular, capital sentencing, police power civil commitment
proceedings, and sexual predator hearings–mental health professionals and
other “experts” on dangerousness are almost always involved in assisting the
decision makers who predict antisocial conduct.16
A number of commentators, writing both before and after Daubert raised
the admissibility threshold, have asserted that this practice should stop or be
severely circumscribed.17 The official organs of the mental health professions
have long voiced similar views. In 1974, the American Psychiatric Association
Paul Gianelli, Daubert in the States, 34 CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 154, 155-56 (1998) for a
description of these tests and their history.
14509 U.S. 579 (1993). See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the
States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 353 (2004) for a discussion of the number of states that have
adopted Daubert.
15Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
In 1999, the Court made clear that this test governed the
admissibility of “technical” and “specialized” knowledge, as well as “scientific” knowledge,
preventing courts from avoiding Daubert’s dictates by classifying testimony as “non-scientific.”
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
16See GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 258-67, 323(2d. 1997) for a discussion of the role
of mental health professionals in commitment and sentencing proceedings.
17Bruce Ennis & Thomas Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 700-702 (1974)(arguing that expert prediction testimony should
be banned); Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 57, 621-22 (1978) (stating that only “hard” actuarial prediction should be
permitted); David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 Science
31, 33-35 (1988) (only actuarial data should be admissible); Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales,
The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Based upon Clinical Judgment and Scientific Research, 4
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 1126, 1250 (1998)(same); Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill,
Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1848 (2003)
(same, but advocating that actuarial devices be “used with caution”).
13See
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stated that “psychiatric expertise in the prediction of ‘dangerousness’ is not
established.”18 Four years later, the American Psychological Association came
to much the same conclusion, asserting that “[t]he validity of psychological
predictions of violent behavior, at least in . . . sentencing and release situations .
. . , is extremely poor, so poor that one could oppose their use on the strictly
empirical grounds that psychologists are not professionally competent to make
such judgments.”19
Today, despite improvements in prediction science,
forensic professionals are still cautious about endorsing opinion testimony
concerning violent propensities.20
The courts have paid no attention to such assertions, however. In 1983,
despite amicus briefs from the American Psychiatric Association incorporating
statements like those quoted above, as well as John Monahan’s 1981 conclusion,
based on a meta-review of the studies, that two out of three long-term
predictions of violence are wrong, the Supreme Court upheld the admissibility
of prediction testimony from mental health professionals in death penalty
proceedings.21 That holding, in Barefoot v. Estelle,22 still stands. If executions
may be predicated on prediction testimony, presumably sex offenders and
mentally ill people subject to commitment may be confined based on such
opinion evidence as well.
Barefoot, however, only announced the constitutional minimum;
evidentiary rules can demand more of experts, as Frye and Daubert do. Using a
four-part analytical framework derived from traditional evidence law,23 I take
an intermediate position between complete exclusion and unquestioned
acceptance of expert testimony on dangerousness. Traditional clinical testimony
regarding a person’s future behavior, while material, probative, and, on its face,
helpful, is so prejudicial (and thus ultimately unhelpful) that in most settings it
should be admissible only if the person first seeks to use clinical testimony to
18AMERICAN

PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N TASK FORCE, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENCE INDIVIDUAL 33
(1974).
19Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, 33 AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978).
20RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC PRACTICE: MENTAL
HEALTH AND CRIMINAL LAW 298, 306 (2005) (noting “the marked limitations of risk assessment
in predicting recidivism for sex offenders” and the “significant errors” produced by modern
risk assessment measures).
21See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. at 899 (describing APA amicus brief) & 901
(describing
Monahan’s conclusion) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
22463 U.S. 880 (1983).
23For a fuller description of this framework, see Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in
Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk? 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1998).
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show that he or she is not dangerous. If the individual eschews such testimony,
then the state should be limited to proving dangerousness using appropriately
normed actuarial instruments or structured interview instruments that are tied
to explicit probability estimates.
This article develops this argument in eight parts. Part I describes the
current state of prediction science. It explains the difference between the three
primary prediction methodologies–clinical, actuarial, and structured
professional judgment–and then evaluates their relative reliability. Part II
examines the relevant evidentiary caselaw, which for the most part has not
differentiated between prediction methodologies, and in any event has usually
permitted any type of prediction testimony, regardless of its basis. Part III
begins my own evidentiary analysis with an assessment of the materiality of
prediction testimony, in particular the extent to which materiality is
undermined by nomothetic (group-based) prediction or prediction based on
characteristics over which the person has little or no control. Parts IV and V of
the article argue that prediction testimony is also usually probative and helpful,
despite its relatively low accuracy rate. It is probative whenever it is derived
from a methodology that produces predictions that are better than chance, and
it is helpful whenever it is based on the literature about violence risk and
avoids ultimate issue language.
Those conclusions establish a presumption in favor of admitting
prediction testimony. However, the fourth component of traditional evidentiary
analysis–which looks at potential prejudicial impact–requires significant
limitations on clinical, as opposed to actuarial, testimony, at least outside the
civil commitment context. Part VI asserts that when offered by the government
in its case-in-chief, testimony that is not linked to specific risk probabilities is
too subject to misinterpretation and misuse, and thus whatever probative value
it has is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. In contrast, when
proffered by the subject of the prediction (the criminal offender or the
respondent in a commitment proceeding), the prejudicial impact of probative
prediction testimony is likely to be slight, given the natural inclination of
factfinders to assume those subject to sentencing and commitment are
dangerous. Thus, the subject should be permitted to introduce clinical
prediction testimony whenever he or she sees fit. Only if the subject decides to
do so should the government be able to use softer prediction testimony, as a
method of responding.
Part VII of the article spells out how this “subject-first” regime would
work in practice. Where material, empirically-derived probability estimates do
5

not exist, the government would have to rely on lay testimony (presumably
regarding past conduct), unless the subject of the prediction opens the door to
use of clinical prediction testimony. That door would be opened when the
offender/respondent uses clinical testimony to contradict claims that he or she
is dangerous, volitionally impaired or untreatable, but not when the defense
expert focuses solely on culpability issues in a sentencing proceeding. This
regime allows the government to prove dangerousness in the most accurate,
least confounding manner, while permitting the offender/respondent to attack
the state’s attempt at preventive detention on the ground that the “numbers”
do not accurately reflect his or her violence potential.
Part VIII of the article briefly describes why the foregoing analysis may
not be applicable to emergency civil commitment. Simply put, short-term
clinical predictions of danger of the type at issue in civil commitment hearings
are probably more accurate than the long-term predictions required in other
settings. Even if they are not, practical reasons might dictate continued reliance
on clinical prediction in this one setting.
As this summary indicates, this article will focus on expert assessments
of dangerousness to others (as opposed to dangerousness to self) in four types
of proceedings: civil commitment hearings, “criminal” commitment hearings
(commitment and release hearings for sexual predators and those acquitted by
reason of insanity), noncapital sentencing hearings, and capital sentencing
proceedings. Much of what is said here may also apply to other settings.24
Limiting the discussion to these four types of proceedings, however, will keep it
within manageable boundaries and at the same time allow closer examination
of those contexts in which expert assessments of dangerousness are most
frequently requested and the type of predictions that have been most
thoroughly researched.
Even within these parameters, the term “dangerousness” can take on a
number of different meanings. For example, in capital sentencing, the term
usually refers solely to one’s propensity to cause serious bodily injury to
another.25 In the civil or criminal commitment contexts, in contrast, it might also

24Shah

identified 11 other stages of the legal process at which dangerousness assessments occur,
including pretrial release hearings, juvenile transfer decisions, and transfer of prisoners to
special prisons for disruptive offenders. Saleem Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring
Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 224, 225 (1978).
25See, e.g., Idaho Code § 19-2515(9)(h) (requiring “propensity to commit murder which will
probably constitute a continuing threat to society”); Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1)
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refer to the likelihood that a person will cause damage to property,26 and can
even encompass emotional harm.27 In civil commitment the focus is on one’s
potential for injurious behavior in the immediate future, while in the other
three contexts long-term dangerousness is the primary consideration. Finally,
the precise likelihood of harm required to justify the intervention may differ
depending upon the type of intervention. For instance, aggravators in death
penalty cases usually must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas civil
commitment is permissible on the lesser clear and convincing evidence
standard.28
The implications of these and other distinctions will be emphasized
where appropriate. Nevertheless, many of the points made in the following
pages are applicable to all four contexts, despite their differences. As one
consequence of this assumption, this article will use the term “dangerousness”–
or, as a synonym, “violence-proneness”–without further explanation, trusting
the reader to recognize that these terms are subject to variations in definition
and proof requirements.
I. The Science of Prediction
Mental health professionals use a number of different prediction
techniques. Research evaluating the accuracy of these techniques suggests that
clinicians are not as poor at prognostication as the critics suggest, although it
also leaves no doubt that expert prediction is far from perfect. The discussion
below describes the various prediction methodologies and their strengths and
flaws, including their relative accuracy.
(requiring “probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society”); Va. Code § 19.2-26
4.4C (same).
26See, e.g., Ark. Stat. § 5-2-315(a)(1)(release of insanity acquittees required if they “no longer
create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of
another”); Hawai’i Rev. Stat. § 334-1 (permitting civil commitment if individual poses a threat
of substantial damage to property); Del. Code tit. 16, § 5001(6) (same); Kan. Stat. § 59-2946(3)(a)
(same); North Dakota Cent. Code § 25-03.1-02(12)(b) (same). In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 364 (1983), the Supreme Court stated, in the context of criminal commitment proceedings,
“We do not agree with petitioner’s suggestion that the requisite dangerousness is not
established by proof that a person committed a non-violent crime against property.” Id. at 364.
27See, e.g., Hawai’i Rev. Stat. § 334-1 (dangerousness to others defined as “likely to do
substantial physical or emotional injury on another”); Iowa Code Ann. § 229.1(16)(b)
(dangerousness to others defined as “serious emotional injury on members of the person’s
family or others who lack reasonable opportunity to avoid contact with the person”).
28Compare Idaho Code § 19-2515(9)(h)(requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all
aggravating factors in capital cases) to Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)(permitting civil
commitment by clear and convincing evidence).
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A. Prediction Methodologies
Until the late 1980s, almost all expert testimony regarding
dangerousness was clinical in nature. That is, it relied on whatever information
the individual clinician deemed pertinent. In the past twenty years, more
structured approaches to prediction have been developed. An actuarial
approach relies, like insurance actuaries do, on a finite number of pre-identified
variables that statistically correlate to risk and that produce a definitive
probability or probability range of risk. A third prediction method–called
structured professional judgment or guided clinical assessment–also relies on an
evaluation of a finite number of pre-defined factors that have been associated
with risk, but neither the factors nor the final conclusions about risk are
mathematically obtained. A final, hybrid prediction methodology, known as
adjusted actuarial assessment, begins with an actuarial assessment that the
professional then adjusts, based on individualized factors not considered in the
actuarial formula.29
An exemplary illustration of the clinical approach to prediction, back in
the days when it was king, is found in a study conducted by Dr. Harry Kozol
and his associates. Each prediction in the study was based on independent
examinations by five clinicians, a battery of psychological tests, and “a
meticulous reconstruction of the life history [of the subject] elicited from
multiple sources.”30 A second example of clinical prediction–but one that sits
at the other end of the spectrum–comes from the case of Estelle v. Smith, in
which James Grigson, a psychiatrist in Texas, purported to be able to deliver an
opinion on competency to stand trial, insanity and dangerousness based solely
on a 90-minute interview with Smith.31
The types of information underlying clinical predictions vary
immensely, from examiner to examiner and case to case. Of particular
importance to Kozol and his associates were “details in the description of the

descriptions of these techniques, see R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender
Risk Assessment?, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & L. 50, 52-53 (1998); Kevin S. Douglas and Jennifer L.
Skeem, Violence Risk Assessment: Getting Specific about Being Dynamic, 11 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. &
L. 347, 352-353 (2005).
30Harry L. Kozol et al., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
371, 383 (1972).
31452 U.S. 454, 457-460 (1981).
29For
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[triggering crime].”32 In addition, they attempted to ascertain the extent to
which the individual:
harbors anger, hostility, and resentment; enjoys witnessing or inflicting
suffering; lacks altruistic and compassionate concern for others; sees
himself as a victim rather than as an aggressor; resents or rejects
authority; is primarily concerned with his own satisfaction and with the
relief of his own discomfort; is intolerant of frustration or delay of
satisfaction; lacks control of his own impulses; has immature attitudes
toward social responsibility; lacks insight into his own psychological
structure; and distorts his perception of reality in accordance with his
own wishes and needs.33
This detailed focus on themes or commonalities in the examinee’s behavior in
order to identify risk or protective factors is sometimes called anamnestic
assessment.34 Dr. Grigson again provides a contrast. In Barefoot, another case in
which he was the prosecution’s key witness, he stated there was a “one
hundred percent and absolute” chance that Barefoot would commit acts of
criminal violence, despite never having interviewed him; rather, Grigson’s
testimony was in response to a hypothetical question describing Barefoot’s four
nonviolent offenses, his arrest on charges of statutory rape and unlawful
restraint of a child, his escape from prison after that arrest, and the events
surrounding the capital murder35 (which admittedly were horrific36).
Actuarial prediction is much more structured than clinical prediction.
Probably the most prominent actuarial prediction device is the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide (VRAG).37 The VRAG focuses on twelve empirically-derived
and relatively narrow variables–no other information is considered in making
the assessment–and its goal is to produce a score that indicates a particular
probability of recidivism. Thus, a score of 0 through 6 on the VRAG is
L. Kozol, The Diagnosis of Dangerousness, in VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 3, 8 (S. Pasternack ed.
1975).
33Kozol et al., supra note 30 at 379.
34MELTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 284-85.
35463 U.S. at 918-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36Barefoot shot at point-blank range a police officer who wanted to ask him questions about a
fire (that Barefoot apparently had started to divert attention from a planned robbery). Barefoot
v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1980).
37The best description of the VRAG and pertinent research is found in VERNON QUINSEY,
VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK (2d. ed. 2005). See also, Grant T. Harris
et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders: The Development of a Statistical Prediction
Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEH. 315 (1993).
32Harry
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associated with at least a 35% probability of “violent recidivism” within seven
years, while a score of 21 through 27 is associated with a 76% risk of such
recidivism over that period.38 A key variable on the VRAG is the individual’s
score on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (described in more detail below);
all by itself, a rating of 35 or more on this measure results in12 points on the
VRAG, which indicates a recidivism risk of 44% (whereas, for example, a rating
of 0-4 on the PCL-R results in -5 points on the VRAG, associated with a 17%
risk). The eleven other variables and their relationship to risk are: elementary
school misconduct (with “severe” disciplinary or attendance problems
warranting 5 points); DSM diagnosis (broken into two variables, with a
diagnosis of personality disorder garnering 3 points and a diagnosis of
schizophrenia -3 points); age at time of triggering offense (26 or under: 2
points); absence of one or both parents before 16, other than through death (3
points); failure on conditional release (3 points); non-violent offense score (3
points if there are either more than two minor offenses or one serious offense,
such as robbery, felony theft, or fraud); marital status (1 point if never married);
victim injury (counterintuitively, 2 points if none, -2 points if death); history of
alcohol abuse (e.g., 2 points if the person is a long term alcoholic and alcohol
was involved in the triggering offense); victim gender (-1 point if female, 1
point if male).
Another actuarial approach, known as the multiple iterative
classification tree (ICT), requires the examiner to analyze risk using what
amounts to risk flow charts.39 For instance, under one classification tree the
evaluator first determines whether the person demonstrates low or high
psychopathy. If low, the evaluator then determines whether the individual has
been arrested only a “few” times or “many” times; if the former the evaluator
then looks at recent violence, if the latter, the examiner ascertains whether the
individual abuses drugs or alcohol. If the individual instead demonstrates
strong psychopathic tendencies, the evaluator first determines whether the
individual suffered serious abuse as a child; if so, then inquiry into substance
abuse occurs. At each step, a particular answer is associated with a particular
recidivism probability.

38A

more recent prospective study found that, over a five-year period, these two categories were
associated with a 42% and 71% chance of reoffending, respectively. Grant T. Harris et al.,
Prospective Replication of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide in Predicting Violent Recidivism Among
Forensic Patients, 26 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 377, 385 (2002).
39A good description of the conceptual work for this instrument is found in JOHN MONAHAN ET
AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE
134 (2001). See also Henry Steadman et al., A Classification Tree Approach to the Development of
Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment Tools, 24 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 83 (2000).
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Other actuarial devices focus specifically on sex offenders. For instance,
the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool relies on 16 variables (for front-end
commitments) or 21 variables (if the offender is being considered for release).40
In addition to scoring points for convictions and arrests and other items similar
to those on the VRAG, this instrument requires the examiner to look at the age
of the victim, the length of sexual offending history, and employment history.
Living up to its name, the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense
Recidivism (RRASOR) relies on only four variables (prior sex offenses, age at
release, victim gender and relationship to victim).41 Each of these instruments
also produces a score that is associated with a particular risk of recidivism.
In an adjusted actuarial approach, the examiner would use one of these
devices as a baseline, but then raise or lower the risk prediction based on other
considerations, typically those known to relate to offending. For instance, an
examiner administering the VRAG might lower the probability of recidivism if
he or she knows the offender has done well in treatment or is about to get
married. Or the risk level might be raised if the individual has made threats or
has stated that, if released, he will join a gang.42
One of the best examples of the final methodology–structured
professional judgment–is the HCR-20 violence risk assessment scheme, which
consists of 20 items relating to three categories of information: historical,
clinical, and risk management.43 The history scale contains ten items: previous
violence, age at first violent incident, relationship instability, employment
problems, substance use problems, major mental illness, psychopathy, early
maladjustment, personality disorder and prior supervision failure. The five
items on the clinical scale are lack of insight, negative attitudes, active
symptoms of major mental illness, impulsivity, and unresponsiveness to
treatment. The five risk management scale items are unfeasibility of plans,
exposure to destabilizers, lack of personal support, noncompliance with
David Epperson et al., Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R):
Development, Validation, and Recommended Risk Level Cut Scores (2003), available at
www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/epperson/TechUpdatePaper12-03.pdf. See also Richard
Hamill, Recidivism of Sex Offenders: What You Need to Know, 15 CRIM. JUST. 24, 30 (2001).
41See R. Karl Hanson, The Development of a Brief Actuarial Scale for Sexual Offense Recidivism 13
(1997), available at www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/corrections/199704_e.pdf.
42See generally, R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment, 4
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & L. 50, 65-67 (1998) (discussing the types of factors that might adjust an
actuarial prediction).
43See Kevin Douglas & Christopher Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme:
Concurrent Validity in a Sample of Incarcerated Offenders, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEH. 3 (1999).
40
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remediation attempts, and stress. Examiners rate each item on a scale of 0 to 2,
making 40 the maximum possible score. Although this scheme resembles the
actuarial devices described above, there is no algorithm that statistically
correlates a given score with a risk probability. Rather, the examiner arrives at
risk ratings of low, moderate or high based on his or her clinical assessment of
the various items in the protocol.
Of course, the scores obtained using the HCR-20 can be and have been
correlated with risk. For instance, a followup study of patients who were
evaluated using this instrument found that while only 11% of those who scored
in the 0-14 range committed or threatened to commit a physically violent act
during a two-year period, 35% of those who scored over 26 did so, and 75% of
those who received the highest scores did so.44 When combined with such
studies, the HCR-20 is not very different from an actuarial device. But a
distinction still exists: whereas actuarial devices like the VRAG were
developed empirically (through studies as to which items statistically
differentiated violent and non-violent offenders), the items on the HCR-20 came
from observational and theoretical research as to the likely correlates of risk.
The same can be said for the Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R),
which consists of twenty factors scored on a 0-2 scale, designed to identify the
extent to which an individual is psychopathic.45 As with the HCR-20, the items
on the PCL-R were developed through clinical observation rather than
mechanistically. Further, the ultimate score obtained indicates degree of
psychopathy, not risk potential. But, as noted above, additional research has
found that the instrument is also a good predictor of violence, with a score of
greater than 30 (on a 40-point scale) indicating a strong propensity for
violence.46

Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric Patients: The HCR-20 Violence
Risk Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, 67 J. CONSULT. & CLIN.
PSYCHOL. 917, 921 (1999).
45Robert D. Hare, The Hare PCL-R: Some Issues Concerning Its Use and Misuse, 3 LEGAL & CRIM.
PSYCHOL. 99 (1998).
46Steven Wong, Recidivism and Criminal Career Profiles of Psychopaths: A Longitudinal Study, 24
ISSUES IN CRIMINOL. & LEG. PSYCHOL. 147 (1995). See also, Marnie E. Rice et al., An Evaluation of a
Maximum Security Therapeutic Community for Psychopaths and Other Mentally Disordered Offenders,
16 L. & HUM. BEH. 399 (1992) (reporting that 77 % of those who scored higher than 25 on the
PCL-R committed a violent offense despite treatment).
44Kevin
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B. A Comparison of Actuarial and Clinical Prediction
Because both the validity research reported below and my proposed
approach to prediction testimony make distinctions between these various
methodologies, a closer look at them will be useful. Each methodology has
advantages and disadvantages.
One advantage of both the actuarial and structured judgment techniques
is that the manner in which they combine variables is more reliable (that is,
capable of being replicated) than the way in which clinical opinions are
formed.47 Each of the first two approaches transparently designate the specific
factors the predictor must consider. Compared to actuarial prediction, the
structured clinical approach gives the examiner more flexibility as to how much
weight to be assigned to each predictor, but it still limits the examiner to the
listed predictors and requires reference to a specified scale (e.g., 0-2). An
unstructured clinical prediction, in contrast, “must ultimately be based upon an
overall subjective impression which is based upon an understanding of the
interrelatedness of many facts.”48 Since “subjective impressions” may differ
from clinician to clinician, and even from case to case for the same clinician,
each clinical prediction will probably be based on a different constellation of
factors, some of which may be irrelevant or based on erroneous stereotypes and
prejudices.49
Furthermore, as indicated above, the probability of violent behavior
obtained through actuarial and structured approaches can be more explicit than
that reached through the clinical process. Because it is not standardized, a
clinical evaluation of dangerousness cannot be reliably compared to other
predictions. At best, the evaluator can give the court information about his or
her own accuracy rate (which is rarely available) and the accuracy rate of other
clinicians who make predictions (which is not particularly helpful in assessing
this evaluator’s work). As a consequence of this paucity of data, honest clinical
evaluators asked to state the violence-proneness of a particular individual can
at best rate subjects as high or low risk, and in doing so have only their
experience and “clinical wisdom” to back them up. In contrast, the VRAG and
47Unlike

the actuarial predictor, “[a] clinical decisionmaker is not committed in advance of
decision to the factors that will be considered and the rule for combining them.” Barbara
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and
Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L. J. 1408, 1423 (1979).
48SEYMOUR HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 314 (1967).
49See MELTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 278-79 (discussing judgment errors and biases that can
affect clinical prediction).
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similar devices definitively state the probability of reoffending within a certain
time period.
An actuarial prediction does have at least two drawbacks, however.
First, actuarial information is not presently available for some of the
populations likely to be evaluated. For instance, minimal data exist about the
reoffending rates of insanity acquittees or offenders sentenced to death. A
purely clinical prediction does not rely upon such information. An actuarial
prediction, in contrast, depends upon some type of followup data for the
relevant population or one related to it, as do structured approaches to the
extent their results are tied to specific recidivism probabilities.
A more telling criticism associated with actuarial prediction–to a lesser
extent also true of structured approaches–is that it cannot help neglecting
pertinent characteristics of the individual evaluated.50 An actuarial prediction
may give us the most explicit information we can obtain about sex offenders
who committed their first sex offense before age 26 against a female victim. But
it tells us nothing about the extent to which other factors that were not included
in the instrument (and not researched by its developers51) might increase or
decrease the potential for reoffending. It is in discovering these idiosyncratic
characteristics that the clinical process provides information, however
imprecise, that an actuarial prediction cannot. Thus, leading researchers in the
area have stated that “actuarial instruments . . . are best viewed as `tools’ for
clinical assessment . . . . This reliance on clinical judgment–aided by an
empirical understanding of risk factors for violence and their interactions–
reflects, and our view should reflect, the standard of care at this juncture in the
field’s development.”52
One final difference between the methodologies–but one that is not as
great as some have suggested–has to do with the types of variables consulted.
Actuarial instruments tend to be more objective than more clinical approaches,
in the sense that they rely heavily on “hard” variables that are relatively easy to
ascertain, such as prior convictions and age. But it should also be apparent

generally Paul Meehl, What Can the Clinician Do Well?, in PSYCHODIAGNOSIS: SELECTED
PAPERS 165, 169-70 (1973) (discussing factors favoring clinical prediction); Underwood, supra
note 47, at 1427.
51Note that the developers of the VRAG considered 50 variables and found that only 12 were
significantly related to violence. Grant Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 L. &
HUM. BEH. 625, 631 (Table 1) (1991). Thus, for the 38 excluded variables, there is some basis for
considering them irrelevant to prediction.
52MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 39, at 134.
50See
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from the above descriptions that actuarial devices can incorporate more
subjective, “soft” variables as well. The VRAG’s reliance on the PCL-R
illustrates the point. The latter instrument requires assessment of the
individual’s glibness, grandiosity, need for stimulation, penchant for
pathological lying, manipulativeness, lack of remorse, affect, callousness, and
similar variables, in addition to delving into specific types of antisocial
conduct.53 Although the scoring criteria for these variables are fairly tightly
defined and can be reliably scored by trained examiners,54 they do not eliminate
the subjectivity of the prediction process.
C. The Validity of Prediction Methodologies
Attempts to gauge the validity of a given prediction confront a number
of obstacles. Two in particular are important to note at the outset. First, those
predicted to be at high risk are generally confined or at least treated, making
ambiguous the relevance of any subsequent failure to offend to assessment of
the prediction’s accuracy. Second, even if release of the purportedly dangerous
person occurs for some reason, following up on a particular prediction to
ascertain whether it is accurate can be very difficult; conviction and arrest
records may seriously under-report crime,55 and self-reports about
incriminating acts can be problematic as well. Thus, any research evaluating
predictive validity is likely to underestimate it.
Even with these caveats, early research on dangerousness predictions
was not encouraging. The initial studies measured validity in terms of false
positives (the proportion predicted to be violent who were not) and false
negatives (the proportion predicted to be nonviolent who were not). These
studies reported false positive rates of anywhere from 40 to 90%, with the usual
finding somewhere in the 60 to 70% range.56 That led to Monahan’s conclusion
in 1981 that the best clinical prediction methods produce erroneous predictions
of dangerousness two out of three times.57

supra note 45, at 100.
T. Harris, The Construct of Psychopathy, 28 CRIME & JUST. 197, 217 (2001) (“The PCL-R has
yielded high interrater reliability and test-retest reliability on prisoners and forensic psychiatric
patients.”).
55See MELTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 283 (reporting a study finding that self-reports increased
base rates from 3 percent to 40 percent).
56See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 110-111, 117-18 (1984) (describing 8 clinical prediction studies
and 3 actuarial prediction studies finding false positive rates ranging from 54% to 94%).
57JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47 (1981).
53Hare,

54Grant
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In light of more recent studies that try to correct for the methodological
difficulties mentioned above, the typical false positive rate for expert
predictions should probably be revised downward to around 50%. For
instance, a study of the ICT showed that 49% of those predicted to be high risk
committed at least one violent act within 20 weeks.58 Other more recent studies,
using both clinical and actuarial methodologies, produce similar or even
somewhat better results.59 As early as 1984, only one year after Barefoot and
only three years after his one-out-of-three statement, Monahan conceded that
even clinical predictions of violence might be correct one out of two times.60
The false positive rate is only part of the story, however. The accuracy of
expert predictions can be fully understood only if base rates of recidivism are
taken into account. If, for instance, the base rate for violence among the
population studied (say, serial sex offenders) is 50%, then a 50% false positive
rate would be no better than chance selection. Those carrying out the
prediction would do just as well simply randomly assigning, with no
evaluation, every second individual to the dangerous category. On the other
hand, a false positive rate of 50% is quite impressive if only 1 out of 100 people
in the relevant population commit crime during the follow-up period; under
these circumstances, a correct prediction of violence 1 out of 2 times would be
50 times better than chance.61
In recognition of this interplay between accuracy and base rates,
researchers developed a second way of measuring predictive validity. The
Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model of Violence Risk Assessment for Persons with Mental
Disorders, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 810, 814 (2005).
59For studies of clinical prediction, see Diana S. Sepejak et al., Clinical Predictions of
Dangerousness: Two Year Follow-up of 408 Pre-Trial Forensic Cases, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF
PSYCHIAT. & L. 171 (1983)(44%); Charles Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to
Others, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS. 1007 (1993) (47%); Jay Apperson et al., Short-Term Clinical Prediction
of Violent Behavior: Artifacts of Research Methods, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1374 (1993)(25%). For
studies of actuarial prediction, see Deidre Klassen & William O’Connor, A Prospective Study of
Predictors of Violence in Adult Male Mental Patients, 12 L. & HUM. BEH. 143 (1988)(40% ) and the
research reported in the text following.
60John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and
Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 10, 11 (1984). See also Randy Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health
Professionals to “Predict Dangerousness”: A Commentary on Interpretations of the “Dangerousness”
Literature, 18 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 63 & n.63 (1994)(“whereas first generation research
suggested that perhaps one out of three people predicted to engage in some kind of violent
behavior will actually go on to do so, more recent studies suggest that one out of every two
people predicted to be violent would go on to engage in some kind of legally relevant, violent
behavior.”).
61I first pointed this out in 1984. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 112-114.
58John
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“receiver operating characteristic” curve represents the true positive rate
(sensitivity) as a function of the false positive rate (specificity). The “area under
the curve” produced by this function (AUC) provides a measure of accuracy as
it relates to base rates. If the AUC value is .50, the predictive power of the
methodology is no better than chance, while an AUC value of 1.0 represents
perfect accuracy and a value of 0 means complete inaccuracy. An AUC value of
.75 for a given prediction methodology indicates a 75% chance that a recidivist
will receive a higher risk rating than a non-recidivist.62
Douglas Mossman reanalyzed 58 early studies (from 1972 to 1991) and
found that, despite their often high false positive rates, 47 of them
demonstrated prediction accuracy “significantly better than chance,” with an
average AUC value of .67 for clinical prediction and of .71 for actuarial
prediction made on a cross-validation group.63 Representative AUC values for
modern actuarial devices are generally as good or better: .76 to .80 for the
VRAG,64 .63 for the ICT,65 and .71 for the RRASOR.66 Studies of the HCR-20
have found AUC values ranging from .69 to .89, depending on the population
studied,67 and research on the PCL-R has obtained a value of around .72.68
These findings obviously do not indicate a high degree of accuracy, but they do
demonstrate that professional predictions are much better than chance
selection.
A separate validity issue is whether adjusting an actuarial prediction
using additional, non-actuarialized factors improves the ultimate prediction.
Some commentators have stated that “[a]ctuarial methods are too good and
clinical judgment too poor to risk contaminating the former with the latter.”69
Douglas and John Weir, HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: Overview and
Annotated Bibliography 4 (2005), available at www.sfu.ca/psyc/faculty/hart.
63Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy, 62 J.
CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 783, 789 (1994). I focus on the medians from studies using crossvalidation samples because AUC values so derived tend to reflect more accurately the realworld validity of a device than AUC values obtained on the sample used to derive the
instrument.
64QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 148 (1st ed. 1998); Harris
et al., supra note 38, at 386.
65John Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model of Violence Risk Assessment for Persons with Mental
Disorders, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 810, 814 (2005).
66R. KARL HANSON ET AL., RESEARCH SUMMARY, CORRECTIONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 13,
Jan. 1997.
67Douglas & Weir, supra note 62, at 5-9.
68M. Dolan & M. Doyle, Violence Risk Prediction: Clinical and Actuarial Measures and the Role of the
Psychopathy Checklist, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCHIAT. 303, 305 (2000).
69QUINSEY ET AL, supra note 64, at 171.
62Kevin
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But others point to research indicating that “considering current clinical
conditions (especially regarding the presence of heightened anger or violent
fantasies) can be an important contribution to assessments of dangerousness.”70

II. The Courts’ Nonchalance Toward Prediction Testimony
Until very recently, none of these nuances affected judicial analysis of
prediction testimony. As noted above, the Supreme Court’s decision in Barefoot
refused to put constitutional limitations on such testimony, at least as long as it
is presented in an adversarial proceeding. Justice White’s majority opinion
gave two reasons for this stance. First, the Court characterized the suggestion
that clinical prediction testimony be prohibited in death penalty proceedings as
“somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel,” given the multiple contexts
in which dangerousness predictions have always been permitted, by laypersons
and experts alike.71 This unquestioning reliance on precedent—in effect saying
“we will not change because we’ve always done it this way”–represents legal
reasoning at its most primitive. The second reason given by the Court provides
a more substantial, if still highly debatable, rationale: “We are unconvinced . . .
that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the
unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when
the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own side of the case.”72
The Court has not revisited the Barefoot issue since Daubert was decided,
so we do not know if the latter decision’s emphasis on reliability would affect
the Court’s constitutional analysis. But it is unlikely to do so. Daubert, Frye and
similar cases interpret the rules of evidence, not the Constitution. The Court is
cautious about using the Constitution to mandate evidentiary practices that
must be followed by every jurisdiction in the country. Rather, the Court
usually sets a low constitutional floor, above which courts and legislatures are
free to experiment.73
To date, only a handful of courts and no legislatures have exercised this
freedom, even when the context is the death penalty. In the 1998 decision of
Nenno v. State, for instance, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL.& L. 409, 437 (2001).
71463 U.S. at 896-897.
72Id. at 901.
73See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
70Thomas
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that any defect in clinical prediction testimony introduced in a capital
proceeding “affects the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.”74
Four years later, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found this position so
clearly supported by precedent that it was willing to characterize any objection
to such testimony as “frivolous” (a particularly strong statement given the fact
that the testimony at issue was offered by the infamous Dr. Grigson).75
Testimony based on actuarial and structured professional judgments is also
routinely admitted in death penalty cases.76
If prediction testimony is admissible to support an execution, it
presumably should be admissible in any case. A survey of the caselaw largely
confirms this surmise. A review of sexual predator cases conducted in 2002
found virtually no appellate decisions upholding challenges to expert
prediction testimony,77 and decisions since then have continued that trend.78 A
2003 survey of civil commitment cases likewise concluded that “[j]udicial
opinion, split on virtually every other form of behavioral or psychic expertise,
has so far unanimously accepted predictive expertise in civil commitments.”79
There are signs of judicial discontent, but they have been scattered and
uninfluential. In his dissent in Barefoot, Justice Blackmun argued that, given the
inaccuracy of clinical prediction testimony and its potential for over-influencing
the jury, courts should hear only “[l]ay testimony, frankly based on statistical
factors with demonstrated correlations to violent behavior.”80 Judge Emilio
74970

S.W.2d 549, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 254 (5th Cir. 2002).
76See, e.g., Martinez v. Dretke, 99 Fed.App. 538, 542 (5th Cir. , 2004); United States v. Barnette,
211 F.3d 803 (2000)(holding that testimony in a capital case based on the PCL-R is admissible
under Daubert).
77Randy K. Otto & John Petrila, Admissibility of Testimony Based on Actuarial Scales in Sex Offender
Commitments: A Reply to Doren, 3 SEX OFF. L. REP. 1 (2002). Trial courts in Iowa, Arizona, Florida
and Missouri have excluded predictive opinion, but appellate courts in the first two states
overruled those decisions, and appellate courts in the latter two states have yet to address the
issue. See In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 614-16 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (“[o]ur research
has revealed no state appellate court decision which has found actuarial instruments
inadmissible at [sexually violent predator] proceedings.”).
78See, e.g., In re Detention of Traynoff, 831 N.E.2d 709 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Com. v. Bradway, 62
Mass.App.Ct. 280, 287, 816 N.E.2d 152, 157-58 (Mass.App.Ct., 2004); State v. Holtz, 653 N.W.
613, 619-20 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (permitting actuarial evaluation only when used “in
conjunction with a full clinical evaluation”).
79Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitment, 55
HASTINGS L. J. 1, 60 (2003). For a long list of cases in which prediction testimony has been held
admissible, see John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among
Prisoners, Predators and Patients, __ VA. L. REV. ___ n.74 (2005).
80463 U.S. at 938 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75Johnson
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Garza, countering his colleagues on the Fifth Circuit, made the same argument
17 years later, and bolstered it with the assertion that, because it is so often
wrong, expert prediction testimony “fails” Daubert.81 A federal district court
judge echoed the latter view in 2004, albeit in dictum.82 And in the past decade
a smattering of state courts have forthrightly concluded that some types of
prediction testimony are inadmissible.83
A noteworthy fact about the latter decisions is that almost all of them
have taken aim at the actuarial method, while continuing to permit clinical
opinion, despite its lesser accuracy. Ironically, these courts exempt traditional,
more speculative expert opinion from screening rules but are willing to subject
newer, more scientific testimony to Daubert or Frye analysis. In contrast, at least
one court has concluded that clinical prediction testimony is so unreliable it
must be excluded; the force of this decision is undercut, however, by that
court’s subsequent willingness to allow clinical opinion as long as it is
combined with actuarial findings.84
In short, the courts have paid virtually no attention to the critics’ plea
that expert prediction testimony be barred or severely limited. No court has
pronounced a complete ban on expert prediction testimony. In those very few
cases where exclusion has occurred, it usually involves actuarial-based
testimony, not more suspect clinical testimony. The rest of this article critiques
these positions, looking in turn at each of the four components of evidentiary
analysis identified in the introduction: materiality, probative value, helpfulness,
and prejudicial impact.
III. Materiality
If dangerousness is at issue–as it often is at sentencing, and always is in
criminal and civil commitment proceedings–the materiality, or logical
relevance, of prediction testimony would seem to be a foregone conclusion. The
issue is not that simple, however. Especially when, as is true for actuarial
81210

F.3d 456 (5th Cir.2000).
v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d 166 (D.Mass.,2004).
83People v. Taylor, 782 N.E.2d 920, 932 (Ill.App.Ct. 2002); Collier v. State
857 So.2d 943, 945-46 (Fla.App.,2003). See generally, Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky,
“Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and
Accountability,” 40 American Criminal Law Review 1443, 1459 & n.90 (2003).
84Compare In re Coffel, 117 S.W.3d 116, 129 (Mo.App. 2003)(excluding clinical prediction
testimony) to In re Care and Treatment of Kapprelian, 168 S.W.3d 708, 715 (Mo. App.
2005)(distinguishing Coffel, and admitting clinical testimony, because here the expert’s opinion
was not based “solely on clinical judgment”).
82U.S.
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prediction, the basis for the prediction is transparent, three types of questions
can be raised: (1) is prediction that is based on studies of groups ever applicable
to a given individual? (2) assuming so, is the particular prediction methodology
used applicable to this particular individual? (3) assuming so, is the prediction
nonetheless immaterial because it relies on factors that are not legally
cognizable (such as race)?
A. Nomothetic Prediction Data
Justice Coyne of the Minnesota Supreme Court succinctly raised the first
issue in his dissenting opinion in In re Linehan: “Not only are . . . statistics
concerning the violent behavior of others irrelevant, but it seems to me wrong
to confine any person on the basis not of that person’s own prior conduct but
on the basis of statistical evidence regarding the behavior of other people.”85
Assume that a person convicted of a sex offense–call him John–receives a score
of 21 on the VRAG. The most accurate characterization of this score is that John
shares a number of traits with a group of individuals, 76% of whom are known
to have engaged in violent recidivism. Justice Coyne’s position is that this
information is immaterial in a proceeding to determine whether John is
dangerous, because it speaks of other people, not John. Mental health
professionals have long expressed similar concerns, with the psychologist
Gordon Allport making the following statement over 60 years ago:
A fatal non sequitur occurs in the reasoning that if 80% of the
delinquents who come from broken homes are recidivists, then this
delinquent from a broken home has an 80% chance of becoming a
recidivist. The truth of the matter is that this delinquent has either 100%
certainty of becoming a repeater or 100% certainty of going straight.86
Neither of these objections render group-based predictions legally
immaterial, however. First, Justice Coyne mischaracterizes the nature of
prediction testimony, because a prediction based on research examining the
behavior of others can still be directly linked to the individual who is the
subject of the prediction. It is John’s age, prior record, marital status, and
psychopathic personality traits that place him in the 76% recidivism category.
Moreover, these types of characteristics are all logically related to recidivism,
allowing us, as John Monahan has pointed out, to make “the inferential leap
from membership in a class that has in the past been violent to the prediction
85In

re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
Allport, The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science, 49 S.S.R.C. BULL. 156
(1942)(quoted in P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 19 (1954)).
86Gordon
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that this member of the same class will in the future be violent.”87 While it is
true, as Allport’s comment above notes, that any given individual either will or
will not offend, it is not incoherent to say that the VRAG score provides us with
76% degree of certainty that John will recidivate. This type of statement is no
different in kind than an assertion that John probably committed a criminal act
in the past (even though he either did or did not) or a prediction, based on a
clinical interview, that he is highly likely to reoffend, a type of statement that
mental health professionals make all the time (with the exception of Dr.
Grigson, who is usually 100% certain88).
This latter comparison suggests another reason why prediction
testimony cannot be considered immaterial simply because it is nomothetic in
nature. Such a position would prohibit not only actuarial prediction testimony,
but clinical prediction testimony as well, and indeed would bar virtually any
type of testimony from mental health professionals or other experts, because
such testimony is inherently based on inferences drawn from others. While
clinicians look at individual patterns, they do not do so in a vacuum. Rather
they make comparisons–sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit–between these
patterns and the patterns of other individuals or groups of individuals that they
know about through experience, training, or education.89 In this regard, most
clinical predictions differ from actuarial ones only in the sense that the link
between past groups and present individuals is not statistically correlated.
B. Nomothetic Prediction and Individual Cases
A willingness to permit reliance on predictions based on nomothetic
information does not necessarily mean that such predictions will be material in
every case. Much depends upon the underlying data’s generalizability.
Sometimes the group data may not be applicable to the individual who is the
subject of the prediction (the norming problem). Even if it is, it may not
address the question the law wants answered (the criterion variable problem).
Finally, even if it does answer the legal question, the prediction may provide
misleading information about the individual in question (the lack-ofindividualization problem). All of these points, which have to do with what

supra note 57, at 66.
T. McCann, Standards for Expert Testimony in New York Death Penalty Cases, N.Y. STATE
BAR J. 39, 31 (July-Aug. 1996)(stating that in every one of the 144 capital cases in which Grigson
testified up to 1992 he stated he was sure the defendant would kill again).
89Cf. Underwood, supra note 47, at 1427 (“like the statistical decisionmaker, [the clinician] treats
the applicant as a member of a class defined by those characteristics.”).
87Monahan,
88Joseph
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Daubert called “fit,”90 can be illustrated by John’s case, which was introduced
above.
Recall that John’s score on the VRAG is a 21 and that this score
supposedly indicates a 76% chance of reoffending. But note that the VRAG was
normed on a group of offenders released from a maximum security psychiatric
hospital in northern Ontario, Canada, in the 1970s, most of whom were white.91
What if John is an African-American sex offender in the United States at the
present time? The applicability of the VRAG data to his case is open to serious
question. In fact, the VRAG’s AUC value when cross-validated on sex
offenders is only .60.92 One commentator has suggested that the norming
problem is “vast and potentially insurmountable” and that without finelytuned cross-validation, “absolute risk predictions based upon [actuarial
instruments] are meaningless.”93
Second, in determining who in their sample population engaged in
“violent recidivism,” researchers for the VRAG included not only those who
committed felonies but those who engaged in two or more simple assaults.94 As
a result, the risk ratios reported by the developers of VRAG do not refer to the
probability of serious violence. That fact substantially reduces the materiality
of the VRAG score for capital sentencing and other contexts in which the legal
inquiry is usually focused on precisely that issue. Consider, for instance, how a
jury should interpret John’s VRAG score of 21, even assuming it is
appropriately normed, if the question to be addressed is whether John exhibits
a “propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing
threat to society” (an aggravating factor under Idaho’s death penalty statute) or
a “probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society” (an aggravating factor under
Texas’ capital statute).95
Finally, as noted above, actuarial devices consider only a limited number
of variables. John’s score on the VRAG does not take into account whether he is
undergoing treatment, is about to get married, has recently lost functioning in
90Daubert,

509 U.S. at 531 (“‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is
not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”)
91QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 64, at 45.
92Marnie Rice & Grant T. Harris, Cross-validation and Extension of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide
for Child Molesters and Rapists, 21 L. & HUM. BEH. 231 (1997).
93Donna Cropp Bechman, Sex Offender Civil Commitments: Scientists or Psychics?, 16 CRIM. JUST.
24, 29 (2001).
94See Litwack, supra note 70, at 428.
95Idaho Code § 19-2515(9)(h); Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 37.071 sec. 2(b)(1).
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one or more limbs, or has found religion. The proponents of the VRAG argue
that, based on their data, these factors are irrelevant.96 But their samples were
certainly not large enough to encompass statistically significant numbers of
every type of treatment or religious conversion experience, or every type of
individual’s reaction to these types of events.97 Unless data exist demonstrating
that these factors do not lower the score of people like John, reliance solely on
the actuarial information might be considered immaterial.
These are all worthy concerns, but none should lead to wholesale
exclusion of prediction testimony. Difficulties concerning norming, criterion
variables, and lack of individualization can all be brought to the attention of the
factfinder. The subject of the prediction can also be given wide latitude to
question the generalizability of the research underlying the actuarial prediction,
and to suggest why that prediction may be offbase in his or her case. With
these precautions, any weakness in the materiality of prediction testimony can
usually be exposed.
Sometimes, however, these difficulties, in combination or alone, will be
so significant that they should go to admissibility and not weight. Further
discussion of when that might occur is best left to analysis of the prejudice
factor in Part VI.
C. Illegitimate Bases for Prediction
The materiality of a prediction may be threatened not only by the factors
it does not consider, but also by the variables it does. At one time, racial traits
were considered a good predictor.98 And the gender and age of the perpetrator
play crucial roles in many prediction methodologies, explicitly when the
prediction is actuarial and implicitly when it is clinical. Yet in many areas of the
law, differentiating between individuals on the basis of race, gender and age
often runs afoul of anti-discrimination principles, in large part because these are

96QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 64, at 177-178 (“[T]here is good evidence that clinicians’ appraisals
of patients’ current clinical conditions are unrelated to recidivism. . . . [I]t is now clear that the
‘getting to know’ individuals that occurs in typical interviews does not improve the prediction
of behavior in any domain.”).
97Note, for instance, that none of the variables excluded by the VRAG researchers involved the
factors mentioned in the text, nor any of the other factors that were earlier hypothesized in
discussing adjusted actuarial assessments (treatment, gang membership, specific threats) or
clinical variables (e.g., anger). Harris et al., supra note 51, at 631.
98Monahan, supra note 57, at 74-75.
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immutable characteristics that usually have very little to do with any legitimate
purpose.99
Some commentators have gone further, suggesting that any characteristic
of an individual over which he or she has little or no control–diagnosis,
personality traits, abuse as a child–should be anathema as a basis for a
prediction. In the course of arguing that actuarial prediction should be barred
from the sentencing setting, Daniel Goodman put this point as follows:
It is a fundamental orthodoxy of our criminal justice system that the
punishment should fit the crime and the individual, not the statistical
history of the class of persons to which the defendant belongs. To allow
a criminal defendant’s sentence to be determined to any degree by his
unchosen membership in a given [group] denies the very premise of selfdetermination upon which our criminal justice system is built. It raises
the threat that defendants will be sentenced not only on the basis of their
personal merit or conduct, but on the basis of their “status.”100
Others have echoed this view, with John Monahan recently arguing that “[p]ast
criminal behavior is the only scientifically valid risk factor for violence that
unambiguously implicates blameworthiness, and therefore the only one that
should enter the jurisprudential calculus in criminal sentencing.”101 If these
prescriptions are followed, then both actuarial and clinical prediction would be
immaterial at capital and non-capital sentencing proceedings to the extent their
predicate ventures beyond criminal history.
A first response to this argument is that even suspect classifications such
as race and gender are constitutionally permissible when they significantly
further a compelling government interest.102 The identification of dangerous
individuals is a very important government interest, and gender and age, at
99See

generally Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (stating “race, like gender
. . . is an immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside” and
thus subject to constitutional protection under the equal protection clause). One is also
powerless to escape one’s age, although the Supreme Court has held that discrimination on the
basis of relative youth (the type of discrimination most relevant to violence prediction) is not
cognizable under the Age Discrimination Employment Act. General Dynamics Land Systems,
Inc. v. Cline 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
100Daniel Goodman, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STANFORD L. REV. 499, 521
(1987).
101Monahan, supra note 79, at 49. See also Underwood, supra note 47, at 1416.
102See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378-379 (2d
ed. 2005).
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least, are extremely useful in making that determination. (Race, on the other
hand, is not a particularly good predictor,103 and reliance on it for prediction
purposes should probably be barred in any event, because of the societal and
symbolic repercussions such reliance would occasion.104)
Second, and more importantly, when the government relies on
prediction to enhance a sentence based on dangerousness, it is not pursuing
punishment based on blameworthiness and retribution, but rather is interested
in prevention based on assessment of risk, a completely different enterprise.
When the government is engaged solely in assessing blameworthiness for past
conduct, as is the case at trial, then Goodman and Monahan are right that
immutable factors should play no role. But at sentencing proceedings in those
states that view the goal to be a mix of retributive and other objectives,
blameworthiness is not the only issue. For instance, retributive considerations
might be considered relevant only in setting the outer limit of the sentence, with
its precise length in a given case dependent upon an evaluation of
dangerousness and rehabilitative potential.105 In such instances, limiting the
basis of any prediction made to factors that indicate blameworthiness (such as
prior crimes) is inconsistent with the purpose of punishment.
What Goodman and Monahan are really saying is that dangerousness is
not a legitimate basis for a sentence. That is a defensible position.106 But if one
accepts the substantive law as a given, as this article does, and if the relevant
law permits sentences to be based on dangerousness, as is the case in many
ET AL., supra note 39, at 163 (showing a correlation between race and violence of
.12).
104As I argued in a different context:
103MONAHAN

[A government] action which depends upon factors such as race denigrates the state’s
interest in maintaining a democratic society and the allegiance of the populace. . . .
Some citizens might see the state’s behavior as a justification for using race as a
surrogate in their own decisionmaking. Other, more sensitive, citizens who experience
or hear about such [actions] will question the legitimacy not only of the [actions]
themselves, but of the government that would permit them. In either case, the
democratic state’s interests are severely damaged.
See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1, 8586 (1991).
105Norval Morris, Predicting Violence with Statistics, 34 STANFORD L. REV. 249, 253 (1981).
106See, e.g., Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001) (arguing that desert and incapacitative principles are
inherently incompatible, and that the latter principle should play no role in the criminal justice
system, which should be based entirely on desert).
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states,107 it does not undermine the criminal justice system’s “premise of selfdetermination” (a premise which has already been honored at trial) to permit
predictions based on immutable or quasi-immutable factors. Furthermore, as a
practical matter, it is hardly protective of the individual’s interests to make
prediction a sentencing issue and then deny the factfinder the best means of
making the prediction.
Monahan himself acknowledges the force of these points in concluding
that, outside the criminal setting, any prediction factor (other than race) is
material. Because blameworthiness is “irrelevant to public health law,” for
instance, Monahan would allow all risk factors to be considered in that arena,
which for him includes civil commitment and, to the extent it is not punishment
in disguise, sexual predator commitment.108 Again, for me the issue is easy,
given governing law. In both commitment settings, blameworthiness is clearly
not at issue as far as the Supreme Court is concerned.109 Thus the principle of
self-determination that the law seeks to implement when blameworthiness is an
issue is not challenged through reliance on unchangeable or difficult-to-change
risk factors in commitment proceedings.

IV. The Probative Value of Prediction Testimony
Probative value, as used here, is a measure of accuracy, and is generally
considered a second aspect of relevancy (the first being materiality).110
Prediction testimony may not be very accurate in an absolute sense, but it is
sufficiently accurate to meet the law’s test of probativeness, whether that term
is defined in the traditional manner or in a Daubertiansense. A separate, but
closely related, issue is whether prediction testimony, even if probative, can
ever be enough to satisfy the relevant standard of proof. Although not

107Even

many of the states with sentencing guidelines, which are normally an attribute of a
desert-based system, permit dangerousness assessments to influence the length of sentence,
usually through a parole board determination. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines:
Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1200 (2005).
108Monahan, supra note 76, at 49.
109See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-362 (1997) (holding that sexual predator laws do
not implicate “either of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or
deterrence.”).
110See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 338-339 (5th. ed. 1999)(“There are two components to relevant
evidence: materiality and probative value. Materiality looks to the relation between the
propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. . . . [P]robative value
[is] the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.”).
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technically an admissibility issue, a negative answer to this question could
result in exclusion as well, so it is considered here.
A. The Evidentiary Threshold
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is probative if it has “any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”111 Expert prediction testimony, even if clinical in nature,
virtually always satisfies this test when dangerousness is the “fact” to be
determined. As explained in Part II, most expert prediction methodologies
produce predictions that exceed chance or random selection. Thus, assuming
no objection on materiality grounds, a prediction using these methodologies
makes a correct resolution of the dangerousness issue more probable than if the
prediction were made without reference to any evidence.
Critics of prediction testimony have been fond of comparing it
(unfavorably) to coin-flipping, apparently on the assumption that the best
possible false positive rate for such testimony is 50%.112 Even accepting that
assumption, the discussion in Part II should make clear why the coin-flipping
analogy does not work. Experts who are wrong more than one out of two times
are only outdone by a coin toss when the base rate for violence is 50% or more.
Yet the base rate for violence in the groups subject to prediction is seldom that
high. As the AUC values reported in Part II suggest, today experts can
correctly identify those who will be violent at an accuracy rate–ranging from 45
to 75%–that is considerably higher than the base rate for violence within the
prediction group–usually in the 15 to 35% range. Thus, the coin-flipping
analogy is specious and misleading.
Nor is expert prediction testimony so unreliable that exclusion is
required under Daubert, despite that decision’s focus on “error rates.”113 The
main thrust of that decision is not that expert testimony should be admitted
only when it is provably accurate (a rule that would require exclusion of
virtually all expert testimony), but rather that its basis should be subjected to
some sort of verification process, preferably scientific in nature, so that it
reflects “the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.”114 Thus,
111Federal

Rule of Evidence 401.
e.g., Ennis & Litwack, supra note 17, at 737; Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 931
dissenting).
113Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
114509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
112See
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for instance, Michael Saks, long an advocate for a rigorous interpretation of
Daubert, nonetheless has counseled against excluding expert evidence simply
because “the witnesses practicing in that field assert erroneous conclusions with
some regularity.”115 As long as the factfinder is “informed about the likelihood
of error in the opinions, and the court [is] satisfied that the factfinder is capable
of properly adjusting the weight to be given to the evidence,” Saks would
permit such testimony.116 On this reasoning, even if research evidences false
positive and false negative rates well above 50%, material prediction testimony
derived from a methodology that does better than chance should be admitted,
as long as the relevant error rates are also provided to the factfinder.
Daubert additionally suggests that courts look at whether the
methodology employed by the expert is generally accepted among those in the
relevant field, which is, of course, also the inquiry required by the Frye test
applicable in most of the jurisdictions that have not adopted Daubert. This
definition of probative value may, at first glance, appear to pose more of a
problem for prediction testimony. As noted earlier,117 even though clinical
prediction testimony has been the mainstay of sentencing and commitment
hearings for some time, the relevant official organizations have expressed
considerable concern about its dependability, as have many adherents of the
actuarial approach to prediction. Nor has the latter methodology always
escaped criticism under Frye:
At least one court has excluded actuarial
prediction testimony because only a small proportion of the relevant profession
is familiar with it.118
The fact remains that both methods of prediction are routinely used by
large segments of the mental health profession, in practice and in court. The
general acceptance notion cannot meaningfully be employed as a means of
determining whether prediction evidence, writ large, should be banned.
Rather, it is best used as a tool for ferreting out good and bad methods of
obtaining such evidence, consistent with Rule 703's requirement that the facts
or data forming the basis for expert testimony be “of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field.”119

J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially Fingerprint
Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2003).
116Id. See also, Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1047, 1058-59 (2003).
117See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
118Collier v. State, 857 So.2d 943, 945-46 (Fla.App.,2003). See also In re Valdez, No. 99-000045CI
(Fla. 2000) (reported in Otto & Petrila, supra note 77, at 5).
119Fed. R. Evid. 703.
115Michael
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Recall the contrast between the clinical prediction process employed by
Dr. Kozol and his associates and that of Dr. Grigson. If the facts upon which a
clinical opinion is based are obtained during a short interview with no reference
to third-party sources, or are taken entirely from a hypothetical question, as
was true of Grigson’s testimony in Smith and Barefoot, respectively, they should
not be deemed “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.” Such
procedures do not, on their face and according to most mental health
professionals, afford adequate protection against inaccuracy. Similarly, there
are accepted and unacceptable ways of using actuarial instruments and
structured professional judgment.
An analysis of prediction testimony’s probative value, then, reduces to
two simple prescriptions. First, a court should permit a mental health
professional to testify on the dangerousness issue only if it is established that he
or she has followed generally accepted assessment procedures that attempt to
insure a high degree of reliability, in both the social science and legal sense of
the word.120 Second, if the testimony is admitted, error rate information must
be provided the factfinder, either through the expert or some other means. If
these conditions are met, the testimony should be considered sufficiently
probative.
B. Evidentiary Sufficiency
Conceptually separate from, but practically related to, the probative
value issue is the claim that prediction experts do not possess the ability to
answer the prediction questions the law asks. In capital sentencing cases
dangerousness must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard of proof
that is also required by many sexual predator statutes.121 In all other
commitment contexts, the Supreme Court has required that dangerousness be
proven by at least clear and convincing evidence.122 If one adopts the standard
quantification of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” as a 90 to 95% degree of
certainty and of “clear and convincing proof” as a 75% degree of confidence
(distinguishing both from the lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard
used in civil cases, which is traditionally equated with a 51% level of certainty),
prediction experts cannot, so the argument goes, satisfy the relevant standard of
the Supreme Court tends to use the word to mean accuracy, see Daubert, 509 U.S. at
589, social scientists use it to mean inter-rater agreement or consistency. See David H. Kaye &
David A. Freeman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
(1994).
121See supra note 25.
122Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
120While
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proof, given their 50+ percent false positive rate. If that is true, the argument
continues, there is no point in having them testify in the first place.123
A first response to this argument is that it confuses the admissibility
issue with the sufficiency issue. As a leading evidence treatise states:
Whether the entire body of one party’s evidence is sufficient to go to the
jury is one question. Whether a particular item of evidence is relevant to
the case is quite another . . . . Thus, the common objection that the
inference for which the fact is offered “does not necessarily follow” is
untenable. It poses a standard of conclusiveness that very few single
items of circumstantial evidence ever could meet. A brick is not a wall.124
One might note, however, that in a substantial majority of sentencing
and commitment cases the expert prediction testimony is the entire body of
evidence. In such cases, the testimony is both the brick and the wall. Then
shouldn’t the sufficiency and admissibility inquiries be merged?
If so, two other responses, one empirical and one legal, are possible.
First, at least when the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence,
expert prediction testimony meets the sufficiency threshold if, rather than
looking at false positive and false negative rates alone, we focus on their
relationship to base rates. Specifically, expert prediction testimony might be
considered clear and convincing proof any time the AUC value for the
methodology in question is .75 or higher. Recall that such a value means that,
given two randomly selected individuals, one drawn from the population of
people who reoffend and the other drawn from the population of people who
do not, there is a 75 percent chance that the methodology at issue will designate
the violent individual a higher risk than the nonviolent individual.
The legal response to the sufficiency problem is to define
“dangerousness” in such a way that error rates are minimized. For instance,
many state commitment laws provide that a person is “dangerous” when he or
she is “likely” or “substantially likely” to harm another.125 If the word “likely”
Stephen Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the
Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 74-76 (1982).
124MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 110, at 640-41.
125See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 954 (Cal. 2002) (holding that
commitment under California’s sexual predator law does not require proof that violence is
“better than even” but only proof of “substantial danger–that is, a serious and well-founded
risk of criminal sexual violence.”).
123Cf.
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is equated with a 51% probability, then proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
a person is dangerous under this definition would only require a 46%
likelihood (.90 x .51) that the person will harm another. Even clinical prediction
testimony can produce such proof of a “definite maybe,” as Monahan and
Wexler described this way of combining the standard of proof with the legal
standard of dangerousness.126 Other legal responses to the sufficiency problem
include requiring a heightened standard of proof only for the relevant risk
factors (e.g., two prior crimes, abuse as a child),127 or for the person’s particular
risk level (whether it be high, moderate, or low).128
All of these ploys may strike some readers as sleights of hand. The
tension between society’s urge to confine those who will harm others and its
inability to identify precisely who these people are is not easily resolved. At
bottom the lack-of-sufficiency argument is an attack on dangerousness as a
legal criterion, not an argument about admissibility. Elsewhere I have
contended that, in many settings, lowering the standard of proof when
dangerousness is the issue is normatively justifiable and consistent with our
current criminal justice jurisprudence.129 But one can also sensibly conclude
that, given the myriad proof problems, dangerousness should be eliminated as
a ground for liberty deprivation. For purposes of this article, the substantive
point will simply be recognized and left at large.

V. The Helpfulness of Prediction Testimony
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the evidence rules of virtually
every state, a witness may not testify as an “expert” unless his or her testimony
“assists” or is “helpful” to the factfinder.130 The courts have paid very little
attention to this requirement in evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony
on dangerousness. In theory, however, helpfulness could be evaluated directly
and empirically, assuming the ability to measure the accuracy of a prediction.
A test of incremental validity in the prediction context would simply compare
Monahan and David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment,
2 L. & HUM. BEH. 37 (1978).
127Cf. Mont.Code 53-21-126(2) (requiring proof of any “physical facts or evidence” beyond a
reasonable doubt, while requiring only clear and convincing evidence for other facts).
128See, e.g., Michael J. Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive
Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 778-792 (1996)(arguing that even when risk is low, if the
detained person belongs to the designated risk group, “there is a one hundred percent chance
that person presents a risk of harm.”).
129Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6-9, 53-58 (2003).
130Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
126John
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the accuracy of predictions made by experts with the accuracy of predictions
made by judges and juries unassisted by experts.
To date, no such direct comparison has been made. However, several
commentators have speculated that, given the inaccuracy of prediction experts,
lay people could do just as well as the professionals, at least when compared to
decisions using the clinical methodology for prediction.131 More concretely, an
analysis of the earliest studies on prediction efficacy concluded that “a
nonclinician furnished with knowledge of past behavior may outperform a
mental health professional relying solely on information garnered from a
clinical interview.”132
If these observations are borne out, clinical prediction testimony might
not be sufficiently helpful to be admissible. In the meantime, however,
common sense suggests that such testimony can, under certain conditions, be
very useful to laypeople who have no experience with prediction. Clinical
prediction testimony can apprise them of potential risk factors they would not
otherwise contemplate. It is unlikely, for instance, that jurors will be able to
discern how a particular person reacts to stress and what types of stress are
most likely to trigger violence in that person without some explanation by a
clinician who is qualified to provide one.
As this last caveat suggests, however, only clinical prediction testimony
that is based on factors derived from the risk literature should be considered
helpful. The typical mental health professional is concerned with diagnosing
and treating mental disorder, skills that are of limited utility in evaluating
dangerousness. As George Dix has argued,133 a clinician unfamiliar with the
research literature on dangerousness prediction should not be considered
qualified to offer a clinical prediction of dangerousness, regardless of
educational or experiential attainments. Clinicians like Dr. Kozol are much
Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Based Upon
Clinical Judgment and Scientific Research, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & L. 1226, 1228 (1998)(“expert
judgments that are clinically derived, as opposed to actuarially derived, are as susceptible to
error as lay judgments”); ALAN STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
33 (1975) (“there are many situations in which a layperson could predict dangerousness as well
as the experts--for example, drug addicts in need of money”); Morse, supra note 17, at 620 (1978)
(reasoning that “[w]ithout hard, methodologically sound quantitative data, the guess of an
expert is unlikely to be better than the guess of laypersons”).
132Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate about Accuracy, 62 J.
CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHIAT. 783, 790 (1994).
133George Dix, The Death Penalty, “Dangerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5
AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 175-77 (1977).
131See
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more likely to meet these threshold requirements than someone like Dr.
Grigson, whose testimony is not only deficient for the procedural reasons
suggested above, but also often seemed to consist of little more than a bow to
the type of past behavior that laypeople can evaluate for themselves. Grigson
himself appeared to agree with this negative assessment of his “expertise.” As
he told a journalist: “I think you could do away with the psychiatrist in these
cases. Just take any man off the street, show him what the guy’s done, and
most of these things are so clear-cut he would say the same things I do.”134
Compared to clinical prediction, actuarial and structured professional
judgment assessments are more clearly useful to lay factfinders. Both are
explicitly based on the risk literature. The specific probability estimates they
provide are also beyond the ken of laypeople. Assuming such assessments are
material and probative, as those terms were defined in earlier discussion, they
are undoubtedly helpful as well.
Whether based on clinical or actuarial information, however, prediction
testimony that goes beyond identifying risk factors and probability estimates to
assert that a person is “dangerous,” a “continuing threat to society,” or
“committable”–in other words, prediction testimony that addresses the
ultimate legal issue–is not helpful.135 The determination as to whether a person
presents a risk to society sufficient to justify indeterminate commitment, an
enhancement in sentence, or the death penalty is solely legal in nature,
dependent upon many factors other than those having to do with risk. For
instance, a 20% probability that a person will harm others might justify shortterm civil commitment, but not the death penalty. Other potential legal
variables include the magnitude of the harm predicted (rape v. simple assault),
its frequency and its imminence.136 Mental health professionals might be able
to provide helpful information on each of these points, but they have no
specialized insight into whether that information authorizes deprivation of life
or liberty; thus they cannot assist the factfinder on that ultimate issue.

Bloom, Killers and Shrinks, TEXAS MONTHLY 64, 68 (July 1978). For the reasons suggested
in the text, Dr. Grigson’s career as a prosecution witness was sharply curtailed in 1995, when he
was expelled from the American Psychiatric Association. See Hugh Aynesworth, Texas “Dr.
Death” Retires After 167 Capital Case Trials, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at A2.
135Federal Rule of Evidence 704 permits expert testimony on the “ultimate issue,” but Rule 702
requires that such testimony be based on “specialized knowledge” that will “assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence.”
136See Alexander Brooks, Dangerousness Defined, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY & MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEMS 680 (1974)(listing magnitude, probability, frequency and imminence as four interrelated factors that should be considered in determining dangerousness).
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Mental health professionals can sometimes helpfully address the
penultimate issue–that is, whether an individual is “likely” or “substantially
likely” to harm another–because that question is an empirical one. However, it
is incumbent on the mental health professional to define what he or she means
when using these types of terms. Furthermore, if such testimony is not
associated with a specific probability estimate, based on actuarial data or
structured professional judgment, then it should generally be barred as unduly
prejudicial, for reasons developed in the next part.

VI. The Prejudicial Nature of Clinical Prediction Testimony
In his dissent in Barefoot, Justice Blackmun explained why he was willing
to permit capital sentencing juries to hear lay testimony about past conduct but
not expert prediction testimony: “[T]he specious testimony of a psychiatrist,
colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of
a medical specialists’s words, equates with death itself.”137 Judge Garza, the
lone Fifth Circuit judge willing to endorse Blackmun’s prohibition of prediction
testimony, expressed similar concerns about its prejudicial impact: “[W]hen a
medical doctor testifies that `future dangerousness’ is a scientific inquiry on
which [he has] particular expertise, and testifies that a particular defendant
would be a `continuing threat to society,’ juries are almost always
persuaded.”138
Of course, the potent influence that Blackmun and Garza attribute to
prediction experts would not be a significant concern if the experts were correct
most or all of the time. But the research literature makes clear that they are not.
If Judge Garza’s assertion that lay decisionmakers are “almost always
persuaded” by expert prediction testimony is true, solid ground for exclusion
would exist.
The Barefoot majority dismissed this concern, confident that the
adversary system is “competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of
[prediction testimony’s] shortcomings.”139 Aided by this process, Justice White
contended for the majority, the factfinder will be able to “separate the wheat
from the chaff.”140 There is good reason to believe, however, that Blackmun
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and Garza are correct and White is wrong about the effect of prediction
testimony in an adversarial proceeding, at least when it is clinical in nature.
As the Barefoot majority noted, cross-examination and rebuttal experts
are usually viewed as adequate means of exposing the shortcomings of an
expert witness.
For instance, the weaknesses of psychiatric testimony
supporting an insanity defense can be exposed through vigorous questioning
and countering expert opinions. But culpability testimony and prediction
testimony differ from one another in a crucial way, one that significantly
undermines the efficacy of adversarial techniques in the latter situation.
Culpability testimony is proffered by a criminal defendant who has admitted,
explicitly or implicitly, the commission of a crime and who must fight de jure or
de facto presumptions of sanity and intentionality.141 The state’s burden on
rebuttal is substantially eased by the natural skepticism such a setting elicits.
Prediction testimony, in contrast, is introduced by the government, either at
sentencing, which directly follows conviction for a criminal offense, or at
commitment hearing, which is also preceded by a violent act of some sort. In
this type of situation, the defense’s case in rebuttal is a much tougher sell.
Advocates against the state’s position must convince the factfinder that the
individual will not do again what he or she has just done.
Of course, sentencing and commitment are not the only proceedings in
which a litigant must overcome a mindset favoring the government; a criminal
trial, initiated by a formal charge against the defendant, is another obvious
example. But the potential pro-state bias at criminal trials is counteracted by
the presumption of innocence and the high standard of proof, and can be
further combated with concrete evidence that the defendant did not commit the
claimed act or that someone else did. Prediction settings are vastly different: no
“presumption of safeness” exists, either as a legal matter or in the minds of the
decisionmakers; the quantum of proof demanded of the state in sentencing and
commitment hearings, in practice, seldom approaches that required at trial, for
reasons developed above; and demonstrating that a person will not act a certain
way in the future is a much more problematic enterprise than proving he or she
did not act a certain way in the past.
To these general points of concern can be added disquieting conjectures
about the likely efficacy of specific rebuttal techniques. One might expect that
providing the factfinder with information about false positive rates (which I

Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
105, 109-111 (2003).
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argued above should always occur) would diminish any tendency to hold the
state expert’s opinion in undue regard. But research on the well-documented
“representativeness heuristic” demonstrates that people tend to lend
significantly more credence to case-specific information than to generalized
statistics.142 Judges or jurors can tell themselves, with some basis, that
regardless of their overall inaccuracy rate, the state’s experts are right this time.
Introduction of case-specific information through a rebuttal expert could, in
theory, redress that problem. But if, as is often the case when offenders or
respondents are indigent, there is no opposing expert,143 or the expert can, in
candor, do little more than identify a few “protective factors” meant to rebut
the state’s “risk factors,” this stratagem will be unavailing as well. The one
study directly on point found that even strong cross-examination and an
opposing expert do not shake the influence of a state expert willing to
pronounce the defendant dangerous.144
Also suggestive of clinical prediction’s power are data on the outcome of
proceedings in which it is offered. A survey of hearings under a Maryland
criminal commitment program found that, despite the fact that the staff’s
prediction of dangerousness was virtually always “contested” (albeit not
always by opposing experts), judges agreed with its recommendations in 86%
of the cases.145 Similarly, only 31 (or 12%) of the 257 patients that Kozol and his
staff originally diagnosed as dangerous were released by the courts, many for
reasons having nothing to do with perceived risk.146 And Texas capital
sentencing juries virtually never disagreed with Dr. Grigson’s clinical
142Saks and Kidd note that the “consistent overprediction of dangerousness is in part due to
experts’ insensitivity to the low frequency of such behavior and reliance on the
representativeness heuristic wherein the person threatened with commitment is compared to
the stereotype of a dangerous person.” Michael Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC. REV. 123, 133 (1980- 81) (citing Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
430 (1972)). If experts do not respond to generalized data, it is unlikely laypersons will.
143At the time of Barefoot’s trial, for instance, indigent defendants in death penalty cases were
entitled to $500 for “investigation and experts.” 463 U.S. at 899 n.5 The Supreme Court has held
that indigent defendants are entitled to state-paid assistance on the dangerousness issue, but
only one such expert, who can be a state employee and who does not have to agree with the
defense position. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
144Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL.
17, 52-53 & Table 4 (1996). Only when the government expert admitted that he might be wrong
two out of three times did study subjects tend to change their minds.
145See Albert Hoff, Patuxent and Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIAT. & L. 144, 154 (1977).
146George Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the “Dangerousness” of “Normal” Criminal Defendants, 66 VA.
L. REV. 523, 538 (1980).
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predictions, despite cross-examination and rebuttal experts.147 At least in these
cases, Judge Garza appears to be right that lay factfinders are “almost always
persuaded” by clinical prediction testimony proffered by the state, a conclusion
that is particularly troubling given the very low likelihood that the judges and
juries involved in them were correct in concluding that more than 85% of the
individuals they committed or sentenced to death would have reoffended if
released.148
One might be tempted to explain these results simply as a demonstration
that, when given the opportunity, laypeople will almost always conclude that
offenders and individuals subject to commitment are dangerous, whether or
not experts confirm that view. In interesting contrast to the above data,
however, is research suggesting that other types of prediction testimony are
much less likely to sway judges and juries. For instance, concordance between
the government’s expert witnesses and the ultimate decision in sexual predator
proceedings, where actuarial testimony predominates, is much lower than
85%.149 Numerous studies have confirmed that clinical prediction testimony is
more persuasive to lay decisionmakers than actuarial testimony, despite the
latter’s superior accuracy.150 Of particular import given the debate in Barefoot
about the usefulness of the adversary process is a study finding not only that
“jurors weigh clinical opinion expert testimony more heavily than actuarial
expert testimony,” but that “adversarial procedures may be insufficient to
remove this bias.”151 A second study confirmed that, while cross-examination

147According

to one report, Grigson “has testified for the prosecution in at least 140 Texas
capital trials; jurors imposed death sentences in more than 98 percent of these cases.” AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL REPORT, THE DEATH PENALTY IN TEXAS: LETHAL INJUSTICE 12 (March 1998).
148One study found that only 21% of those sentenced to death as dangerous by Texas jurors
committed any type of violent act while in prison. James W. Marquart et al., Gazing into the
Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 L. & SOC. REV. 449,
463 (1989).
149See Fitch & Hamen, supra note 2, at 32 (indicating that, between 1999 and 2001, only 473
individuals had been committed under sexual predator laws, despite several thousand petitions
for such commitments).
150Daniel Krauss and D. Lee, Deliberating on Dangerousness and Death: Jurors’ Ability to
Differentiate Between Expert Actuarial and Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness, 26 INT’L J. L. &
PSYCHIAT. 113 (2003); Randy Borum, Improving the Clinical Practice of Violence Risk Assessment, 51
AM. PSYCHOL. 945 (1996); William Gardner et al., Clinical versus Actuarial Predictions of Violence in
Patients with Mental Illness, 64 J. CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 602 (1996).
151Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony on Juror
Decision Making in Capital Cases, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & L. 267, 305 (2003).
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of clinical testimony has little impact on dangerousness ratings, crossexamination of actuarial testimony does reduce those ratings.152
These findings make sense. Cross-examination and rebuttal experts
aimed at attacking the risk factors underlying clinical prediction testimony will,
at best, be able to suggest in some vague way that the subject is a lower risk
than the state’s expert believes. In contrast, when risk factors are associated
with a precise probability of recidivism, as occurs under the actuarial approach,
cross-examination and rebuttal can suggest in more concrete terms how that
probability will be lowered if particular factors are not present or particular
protective factors are present. Laypeople may also be less likely to give in to
their pre-existing inclination to find offenders and commitment respondents
dangerous when the expert says “this person belongs to a group that reoffends
at a [particular] rate,” rather than simply pronounces that the person is “a high
risk” or is “likely to reoffend.”
The implications of these observations and research findings are twofold.
First, the government should not be permitted to introduce clinical prediction
testimony in its case-in-chief. Contrary to the assertion of the Barefoot majority,
the adversarial process cannot effectively expose the shortcomings of this type
of opinion evidence, with the result that lay decisionmakers give it too much
weight. Balancing the relatively low probative value and helpfulness of such
testimony against its prejudicial impact requires its exclusion.
The same balancing analysis suggests the opposite result, however,
when the government seeks to introduce prediction testimony tied to
empirically-based probability estimates associated with actuarial assessment
and some structured professional judgment instruments. As earlier parts of
this article demonstrated, the latter type of testimony is both more probative
and more helpful than clinical prediction testimony. And, as just discussed,
testimony based on empirically-derived risk estimates is not as likely to be
misused by the factfinder. Perhaps, given its quantified nature, laypeople are
better able to judge the true import of such testimony, or perhaps they are
simply more distrustful of information in the form of data than information that
tells an individualized “story” about the subject of the prediction.153 Whatever
its cause, this differential impact on the factfinder leads to the conclusion that
the government should be able to use such testimony in its case-in-chief.

A. Krauss et al., The Effects of Rational and Experiential Information Processing of Expert
Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, 22 BEH. SCI. & L. 801, 814 (2004).
153See Krauss & Sales, supra note 141, at 301.
152Daniel
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VII. The Subject-First Regime
The foregoing analysis does not require a complete ban on clinical
prediction testimony. The offender/respondent (who from now on will simply
be called the subject) should still be able to use clinical prediction to undermine
the state’s claim that he or she is a menace to society. Although clinical
prediction testimony is less probative and less helpful than testimony that
reports empirically-based risk estimates, it is also less likely to have a
prejudicial impact when it is proffered by the subject as opposed to the state.
That is because, when proffered by the subject, prediction testimony is aimed at
dispelling preconceptions, not feeding them. Under such circumstances, it is
much less likely to overinfluence the factfinder.
A second reason for this position is that the subjects of prediction
hearings should not be prevented from telling the best story they can about
their future. Indeed, their interest in advancing their unique case may be
entitled to constitutional status. In Rock v. Arkansas,154 the Supreme Court
held that both the sixth amendment right to present evidence and the due
process clause dictate that testimony proffered by criminal defendants be
admitted unless it “is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the
traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable a defendant
from presenting her version of the events for which she is on trial.”155 Although
Rock focused on the right of the criminal defendant to testify, it has come to
stand for the broader proposition that the Constitution guarantees the accused
the right, in Rock’s words, “to present his own version of events.”156 Although
the sixth amendment does not apply to civil proceedings, and thus may not
govern commitment hearings, the due process clause, on which Rock also relied,
does. Thus, unless demonstrably unreliable or “immune” to adversarial
testing, both clinical and actuarial prediction testimony should be admissible
when presented by the defense.
Under a subject-first regime, that option would be available, although
choosing it would open the door to rebuttal using the same kind of evidence.
When the state’s actuarial evidence is weak, subjects are unlikely to opt for this
154483

U.S. 44 (1987).
at 61.
156Id. at 52. For elaboration of this point, see Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause:
Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1275, 1316-51 (2002); Christopher Slobogin,
The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information in Criminal Trials: From Primitivism to Daubert to
Voice, 5 PSYCHOL, PUB. POL. & L. 100, 114-119 (1999); Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the
Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the
Conventional Wisdom About Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 GEORGETOWN L. J. 621, 636 (1998).
155Id.
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strategy. When it is strong, they are more likely to do so, arguing, in effect, that
the statistical estimates should be adjusted downward in light of personal
characteristics that the actuarial analysis did not take into account.
The subject-first approach has a time-honored analogue in the character
evidence rule.157 Recognized in some form in every state and the federal
courts,158 this rule prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence
concerning the defendant’s character in a criminal trial unless the defendant
first raises the character issue. The rule’s prohibition is motivated by the same
type of evidentiary concerns that were just raised in connection with clinical
prediction testimony. Evidence of bad character is relevant to the question
whether the defendant committed the crime because it shows that the
defendant has a tendency to commit crimes or other bad acts and thus might
have committed the one currently being prosecuted. But against the probative
value of such evidence must be weighed the possibility that proof of bad
character will lead the fact finder to convict the defendant merely because he or
she has been a bad person, rather than because the state has proved its case.
Because the risk is so great that negative character evidence will produce an
erroneous decision, its introduction is barred unless and until the defendant
decides that its potential for misleading the fact finder can be overcome (or at
least neutralized) by countervailing evidence of good character.159
Analogously, because the risk is great that clinical prediction testimony will
prompt an erroneous prediction, its introduction should be prohibited unless
the subject opens the door to its use.
The character evidence rule serves as a well-established precedent for the
type of rule proposed here. However, there are some unique conceptual and
practical issues that arise in applying a subject-first rule to clinical
dangerousness testimony. The following three sections explore the most
important of these issues.

157Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except: (1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same . . .”).
158Indeed, the advisory committee note to the federal character evidence rule states that the rule
“is so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional proportions . . .
.”
159See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948) (“The overriding policy of excluding
such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its
disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.”).
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A. The Type of Evidence the State May Use to Prove Dangerousness
If the state is barred from introducing clinical predictions, it will be
deprived of a primary means of proving dangerousness. But, for the reasons
outlined above, it may still rely on empirically-based risk estimates that are
material to the case. As indicated in Parts II and III, for some populations and
some types of harmful behavior, material statistical information is scarce.
Courts will thus sometimes have to make difficult decisions as to whether a risk
estimate derived from an actuarial instrument normed on a dissimilar
population or using a definition of harm that varies from the applicable legal
standard can reasonably be extrapolated to cover the case at hand.
If not, the state should still be able to introduce lay evidence describing
prior antisocial acts. The strong consensus of the risk literature is that the
number and type of prior violent acts committed by an individual are the most
relevant factors to a prediction of future behavior.160 The type of proceeding
involved will dictate the type of prior acts that might be considered. If, as the
Supreme Court suggested in Jones v. United States,161 larceny is dangerous
behavior for purposes of commitment of insanity acquittees, then evidence of
past thefts would be admissible in such proceedings, even if those acts neither
harmed nor threatened anyone. On the other hand, such evidence may not be
admissible in a capital sentencing proceeding concerned with determining the
defendant’s potential for committing serious bodily harm in the future. Courts
will also have to decide, as they do now in sentencing and other contexts,
whether evidence short of conviction for an offense is sufficient proof of a
particular prior bad act.162

V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME & JUSTICE 303,
316-17 (1997) (“Research on the prediction of criminal behavior repeatedly demonstrated
criminal record to be the single best predictor of future offending.”); Monahan, supra note 57, at
71 (1981)(“If there is one finding that overshadows all others in the area of prediction, it is that
the probability of future crime increases with each prior criminal act.”).
161463 U.S. 354, 365 n.14 (1983) (“[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as ‘nondangerous’ is to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder or
assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the same as to both.”)(quoting
Overholser v. O’Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).
162After the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
sentencing courts are no longer permitted to rely on evidence of prior bad acts to enhance a
sentence beyond the statutory or guidelines maximum unless they resulted in conviction, are
stipulated to by the defense, or were found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. It remains to
be seen whether this rule applies in commitment hearings, where the sixth amendment right to
jury trial in criminal cases–the basis for the Apprendi ruling–probably does not apply.
160Julian
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Finally, of course, if the subject opts to use clinical prediction testimony,
the state may do so as well. This follows from the analogy to the character
evidence rule, as well as general fairness principles.
B. When the Subject Opens the Door
Determining when the subject should be said to have “opened the door”
to state use of clinical prediction will not always be easy. Certainly, if the
defense puts a clinician such as Dr. Kozol on the stand to discuss risk factors,
the state may respond in kind. At the same time, the defense should be able to
respond in kind to both actuarial-type prediction testimony and lay testimony
about past acts without fear of triggering state use of clinical prediction
evidence. But other scenarios present harder questions.
In criminal commitment proceedings, a commonly contested threshold
issue is whether the subject is mentally disordered.163 Because this issue
focuses on present mental state, use of a mental health professional to address it
should not authorize state use of clinical prediction testimony. In sexual
predator commitment proceedings, however, the issue of whether the subject
has a “mental abnormality” is often explicitly defined in terms of whether the
condition “predisposes” the individual to commit further violent acts.164 If the
defense decides to use a clinician to address this subject, it is in effect
introducing clinical prediction testimony. In such situations, the state should
be entitled to respond in similar fashion.
A second, closely related issue that arises in sexual predator proceedings
(and perhaps in other commitment proceedings as well) is whether the subject
is volitionally impaired. This inquiry appears to be mandated by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kansas v. Hendricks,165 which upheld sexual predator
commitment on condition that the state show that the individual is dangerous
“beyond [his or her] control.”166 This language implies that the state must show
some evidence of impulsivity or undeterrability in order to commit under these

163See,

e.g., Fla.Stat. § 916.15(1) (requiring a showing of “mental illness” as a predicate for
commitment of insanity acquittees).
164See, e.g., Kan.Stat. § 59-29a02(b) (defining “mental abnormality” as a “congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety
of others”).
165421 U.S. 646 (1997)
166Id. at 358.
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laws.167 Although one’s propensity to act impulsively might be distinguishable,
in a technical sense, from one’s dangerousness, the two concepts are so closely
related that, once again, a defense decision to use a clinician on the former issue
should permit the state to use a clinician to address either or both.
A third potential door-opening scenario involves sentencing.
In
sentencing proceedings, particularly capital sentencing proceedings, offenders
frequently present clinical evidence about culpability, in an attempt to mitigate
the disposition. Thus, a defense witness might testify that the subject was
suffering extreme mental or emotional distress at the time of the offense, or was
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her criminal acts.168 This
testimony will often be based on precisely the same type of information an
anamnestic approach to clinical prediction might collect. Here, however, the
defense’s expert is clearly focused on past mental state and culpability issues,
not future acts and dangerousness. Such testimony should not authorize state
use of clinical prediction testimony.
Finally, both criminal commitment and sentencing proceedings
frequently focus on the treatability of the subject.169 This scenario is the most
difficult to resolve in a subject-first regime. Both dangerousness and treatability
assessments involve predictions. More important, when the defense introduces
clinical evidence based on the latter type of assessment, it is often suggesting
that the individual either is not dangerous or will not be so for long, given
proper treatment. Frequently, however, such testimony may focus on
therapeutic modalities, such as anti-depressant medication or occupational
therapy, that are not directly aimed at preventing the reoccurrence of violent
behavior. In such circumstances, the court may need to make a sensitive
appraisal of the testimony’s scope in order to determine whether the state
should be able to use clinical prediction evidence.

have argued that Hendricks should be construed to require true “undeterrability,” i.e., a
showing that the individual will commit violent acts even when the likelihood of apprehension
and significant punishment is very high. Slobogin, supra note 129, at 40-48.
168For instance, roughly two-thirds of state capital sentencing statutes recognize these two
conditions as mitigating factors. Ellen Fels Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating
Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296-98 (1989).
169See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS,
standard 7-7.4(d) ((“If the court is persuaded that acquittee will continue to receive the needed
treatment or habilitation, it may order . . . that acquittee be released . . .”); American Law
Institute, Model Penal Code § 7.01(2)(j) (Official Draft 1980) (mitigation possible if “the
defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment”).
167I
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As an efficiency mechanism, the defense could be required, analogous to
common practice with respect to testimony on insanity,170 to give notice to the
state and the court whenever it is contemplating using a clinician at criminal
commitment or sentencing. In that way, door-opening issues can be sorted out
prior to adjudication and the state can prepare accordingly. Even with this
adjustment, a subject-first regime should not involve a major shake-up of
current defense practice. Defense use of clinicians on mental abnormality and
volitional impairment issues in commitment hearings is and probably will
remain rare, and when the defense does decide to have a clinician testify on
those issues it will probably also want the prediction issue addressed, so the
door will be opened in any event. A similar coincidence of aims will usually be
present when treatability is at issue. If not, the defense may often be able to
structure the clinician’s testimony about treatability so that it does not address
dangerousness.
C. When the State May Use a Clinician on Other Issues
The state’s prerogatives with respect to experts should mirror the
subject’s even on issues other than dangerousness. If the defense uses an expert
to address dangerousness issues in disguise (“predisposing” mental
abnormality, volitional impairment or treatability), the state should be able to
do so as well. However, if the defense chooses not to use an expert on
dangerousness or these related subjects, the state should not be able to so either.
Instead it must rely on empirically-derived probability estimates or lay
testimony to address these issues.
The one exception to this rule, consistent with what was said above in
connection with the defense’s prerogatives, is that the government should be
able to present clinical testimony about treatability when it does not directly
implicate dangerousness. For instance, in an insanity acquittee commitment
hearing, the state should be able to introduce clinical evidence showing that, if
the subject is found to be dangerous, treatment would be most efficacious in an
inpatient unit rather than on an outpatient basis.171 It also bears iteration, with

170Every

jurisdiction requires the defense to provide notice of an intent to raise an insanity
defense. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 919 (2d ed. 1999).
171Cf. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, standard § 7- 7.4(d)
(providing that if the court finds that the only reason an insanity acquittee does not meet the
commitment criteria is because of the effect of treatment or habilitation, “the acquittee may be
committed unless the court is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee
will continue to receive such treatment or habilitation following release for as long as the
treatment or habilitation is required.”)
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respect to the treatability issue, that the state would always be permitted to
present both hard actuarial data on the prognosis for given populations of
patients and reports of prior treatment successes or failures with respect to a
particular individual, analogous to the actuarial and lay proof of dangerousness
that the state is always permitted to adduce.

VIII. Civil Commitment
The prohibition on state use of clinical prediction testimony in its casein-chief and the associated subject-first rule, which I have argued should
govern sentencing and criminal commitment, probably should not apply to
civil commitment, at least at the front-end. This is so for two reasons, one
practical, one evidentiary.
The practical reason is simply that the proposed regime could probably
not be implemented in the emergency commitment setting. A mentally ill
person who has just threatened to kill his wife or take a sledgehammer to a
neighbor’s car should not be allowed to go free while the information necessary
to make an actuarial or structured professional judgment is collected. Such
individuals are often brought to a mental health professional who, using his or
her best clinical judgment, must decide immediately whether to hospitalize
them, against their will if necessary. Given these exigencies, state use of clinical
predictions of dangerousness and treatability may be unavoidable, nor would
there be time for the defense to assess its options and give pretrial notice of the
type proposed above.
The second reason evidentiary restrictions on prediction testimony
might be relaxed in the emergency commitment setting is that the prediction
called for in such situations is likely to be more accurate than the long-term
predictions that have been the focus of discussion to this point. John Monahan
has summarized the theoretical grounds for this assertion as follows:
In emergency commitment, . . . there is a small situational and temporal
“gap” between the behavior used as a predictor and the outcome that is
being predicted. One is directly sampling actions, e.g., threatening words
and gestures, that are “as similar as possible to the behavior used on
criterion measures,” e.g., fulfilled threats. In violence as in other areas, it
is potentially true that “predictions about individual behavior can be
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generated accurately from knowledge of the environments in which the
behavior occurs.”172
If in fact, as research to date suggests,173 clinical predictions based on recent
behavior in the community can provide “clear and convincing proof” that the
individual will behave violently in the near future, the rationale for the subjectfirst rule is significantly weakened in connection with front-end commitments.
Both the practical and evidentiary arguments against the defendant-first
approach begin to lose their persuasiveness, however, as one moves out of the
emergency detention context. If, for instance, a commitment proceeding takes
place two or more weeks after the initial intervention (as provided for in several
state statutes),174 there will probably be time for the respondent to gather the
appropriate nonclinical information and make a decision regarding the
presentation of clinical testimony. More importantly, the accuracy of any
clinical prediction of dangerousness will decrease as the “situational and
temporal gap” between the precipitating behavior and the outcome that is
being predicted (that is, violence in the community) increases; prejudice
concerns again become paramount. An added concern is that adversarial
protections are notoriously lacking at civil commitment proceedings;175
although previous discussion suggested cross-examination and rebuttal
witnesses are seldom successful at exposing flaws in clinical prediction

172Monahan, supra note 57, at 59 (quoting W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 168
(1968)).
173Jay Apperson et al., Short-Term Clinical Prediction of Assaultive Behavior: Artifacts of Research
Methods, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1374 (1993)(finding a 25% false positive rate for short-term
predictions in emergency commitment context); Renee Binder, Are the Mentally Ill Dangerous?,
27 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIAT. & LAW 189, 197 (1999) (summarizing research indicating that
short-term predictions are better than long-term predictions); Earl Rofman et al., The Prediction
of Dangerous Behavior in Emergency Civil Commitment, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1061, 1063 (1980)
(producing a 59% false positive rate but noting that those predicted to be dangerous were
immediately medicated, and thus that “the probability of the patients in [the] experimental
group (who would be unmedicated outside the hospital) committing assaults in the community
would have far exceeded 41% without emergency commitment.”). See generally Thomas
Litwack & Louis Schlesinger, Assessing and Predicting Violence: Research, Law and Applications, in
HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 205, 224 (Irving B. Weiner and Allen K. Hess eds., 1987)
(specifying conditions in which clinical predictions of violence can provide clear and
convincing evidence of dangerousness in the commitment context).
174See, e.g., Cal. Code § 5250 et seq. (providing for a full judicial hearing after 14 days of
detention).
175See RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 763-64 (4th ed. 2004) (summarizing research).
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testimony, their absence here nonetheless enhances the need for a subject-first
rule outside the emergency setting.

Conclusion
Expert prediction testimony–whether based on actuarial, structured
professional judgment, or clinical assessment–will usually be material,
probative and helpful, if certain tenets are followed.
When prediction
testimony is based on group data, the materiality factor requires courts to pay
close attention to norming and criterion variable issues. To ensure that
prediction testimony is both adequately probative and optimally helpful, courts
should only qualify as experts those mental health professionals who are
familiar with the risk literature and modern risk methodologies and who utilize
appropriate assessment procedures; courts should also ensure that those
experts they permit to testify describe, or at least respond to, the pertinent error
rates and avoid the ultimate legal issue of whether a subject’s risk factors
require legal action.
Finally, in sentencing and criminal commitment
proceedings, courts should exclude even qualified testimony when it is clinical
in nature (rather than grounded on empirically-derived probability estimates)
unless it is presented by the defense to support a claim of nondangerousness or
by the state to rebut the same.
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